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ADVOCATING THE RIGHTS OF THE INJURED*

Benjamin Marcust

W

HEN workmen's compensation was first introduced a half
century ago, it was felt necessary to cushion the shock in a
number of ways. One of these was the idea of a bargain, an exchange, in which the worker, to obtain the new remedy based on
liability without fault, gave up his existing remedy, the right to a
tort action against his employer for a negligent injury. 1 It is time
that the terms of that bargain be re-examined.
The continuing inadequacies of workmen's compensation
make clear that the workman has never really received all that he
supposedly bargained for. Compensation payments continue to
bear little relationship to the actual need of the injured and his
family. Coverage as to types of employment, injury and disease,
while extended during the years, is not yet sufficiently inclusive.2
And, notwithstanding the fact that workmen's compensation was a
great step forward and has been improved in many respects over
its fifty years, its present status does not encourage the view that it
will ever constitute a complete and adequate answer to the problem of industrial injuries. This suggests that we should now
consider the possibility of retaining compensation, while supplementing it with other remedies.
This has already happened in England, whose laws and poli• This article is taken substantially from a chapter of the forthcoming book entitled

Occupational Disability and Public Policy, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, edited
by Earl F. Cheit and Margaret S. Gordon, and published by John Wiley and Sons,
New York, Permission to publish it here is gratefully acknowledged.-Ed.
t Member of the Michigan Bar.-Ed.
1 See generally PROSSER, TORTS 382-83 (2d ed. 1955); Somers, Myth and Reality in
ll'orkmen's Compensation, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABoR, BULL.
No. 192, at 18, 23-26, in INTERNATIONAL AssoCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARDS AND
COMMISSIONS PROCEEDINGS (1953). [Proceedings of this Association will be cited hereinafter as IAIABC PROCEEDINGS.]
2 CHEIT, INJURY AND R.Ec:OVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 4-5 (1961); SOMERS &:
SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, particularly Coverage and Benefits 38-92 (1954)
(hereinafter cited as SOMERS]; Skolnik, New Benchmarks in Workmen's Compensation,
25 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. No. 6, at 3-18 (1962), in particular: "From the available data,
it appears likely that workmen's compensation is leaving unmet, on the average, more
than three-fifths of the total wage loss in temporary disability cases. For work injuries
that result in death or permanent disability, the proportion of the wage loss compensation is even less, partly because the compensation is more likely to be subject to
statutory maximums on duration of benefits or on aggregate payments." Id. at IO.
See also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 212, STATE
,voRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAws: A COMPARISON OF MAJOR PROVISIONS ,vrrH RECOMMENDED STANDARDS (1961).
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cies have always strongly influenced us in this field. 3 Our original
remedy of tort liability was adopted from the English common
law, as were the defects which ultimately led to its abandonment
as a remedial device for injured workmen. Our original workmen's
compensation acts, though they drew their inspiration partly from
the earlier German model, were largely patterned on the English
statutory provisions. Should we now follow the English by restoring the right to sue in tort, as an additional remedy, while at the
same time retaining compensation? We may shed some light on
this by looking at the role of advocacy and of the advocate as it has
developed in our own system.
l.

EARLY LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SYSTEM

When the problem of industrial injuries arose-in the first half
of the nineteenth century, the first reaction of both the English
and the American courts was to protect industry through the
development of what came to be called the employers' "commonlaw defenses," specifically, contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine. Partly because of this and
other forms of legal encouragement, industrial development proceeded rapidly, but at the cost of a tremendous toll in uncompensated human suffering on the part of productive workers and their
families and dependents.
By the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the
sheer inhumanity of this system had reached such proportions that
it could no longer be borne, especially since it was obvious that
industry was no longer so feeble and immature as to require such
subsidies, if indeed it ever had been. Reform was demanded with
increasing insistence, and it eventually had to come.4 It proceeded
in two stages. The first was the adoption of employers' liability
acts, which retained the fault principle of the common law, but
modified the employers' common-law defenses. 5 The second, workmen's compensation, abandoned the fault principle and treated
3 For an excellent exposition of the English experience with workmen's compensation, see SOMER 299-308. See also VESTER 8: CARTWRIGHT, INDUSTRIAL INJURIES (1961) (2
vols.).
4 See DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 19-26 (1936); HARPER &:
JAMES, TORTS xlii-xliii (1956); RIESENFELD &: MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION
137-38 (1950).
5 See I LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 29-32 (1952).
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employment-connected disability, like the breakdown of the machines themselves, as part of the costs of production which ought
to be borne by the enterprise-and ultimately by the consumers
of its products. 6 To make sure that the enterprise would be able to
meet this cost, some of the laws required employers to insure
against it, or to qualify as self-insurers.
The new system of workmen's compensation was shaped in
many ways by the reaction against the defects of the system which
it displaced. The common law had failed to handle the problem.
The obvious requirements of humaneness toward the injured
workman and his family had been frustrated by technical and
often artificial legal doctrines. The expense of litigation had been
a hardship on the injured worker and often a deterrent against
his seeking any relief. The inability of the common-law tort action
to produce any relief (except in the form of a possible compromise
settlement) until a judgment had been reached, after months or
years of delay, made it altogether ill-suited to meet the injured
workman's immediate need, which was for the prompt receipt of
money to make up for a sudden loss of income accompanied almost
immediately by medical expenses. This put the injured employee
or his dependents under considerable pressure to accept an unfavorable and unfair compromise settlement, merely because it was
the only way in which immediate cash needs could be met.
The new workmen's compensation system, it was hoped, would
cure each of these defects. It would be simple and commonsense
in its provisions, devoid of legalisms. It would provide relief which,
though not generous, would be certain and immediate. 7 And it
was hoped that, through such devices as injury schedules and
benefits fixed by statute, it could be made largely automatic, so
that there would be few occasions for adversary proceedings and
little need for the intervention of lawyers.
Some of these hopes were realized, or partially realized, but
others were in considerable degree disappointed. The promptness
6 The old slogan, "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workmen,"
succinctly describes the underlying philosophy of workmen's compensation. See PROSSER,
op. cit. supra note I, at 383.
7 See 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 4-6, particularly: "The ultimate social
philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of providing, in
the most efficient, most dignified and most certain form, financial and medical benefits
for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community would
feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the
burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the consumer
of the product." Id. at 5.
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of initial payments provided a striking contrast to the old system.
And, while relief did not prove to be certain, it was, of course,
available in a much higher proportion of cases than formerly. But
the adversary element inhered in the new system as it had in the
old. And the chief result of the effort to eliminate lawyers, in the
early years, was simply to eliminate lawyers on one side, but not
on the other.8

II.

EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL AnvoCACY

As an industry of insurance carriers grew up to undenvrite
the new risk, an ex.pert, specialized, full-time defendants' bar grew
up with it to defend the legal interests of such carriers and to oppose compensation claims. The first two decades of workmen's
compensation were thus largely a period of unilateral advocacy,
the results of which were, of course, one-sided, as might have been
expected. 9
The effect was to weaken the new system and to incorporate
into it many elements of the old system that it was designed to
replace. There was a tendency to inject into the administrative
hearing, designed to be informal, common-law rules of evidence
and procedure.10 Restrictive definitions of "employee" were sometimes imported into the new statutes in disregard of the fact that
such constructions had originated in cases dealing with the employer's liability to third persons for the torts of those working for
him, and thus rested on considerations entirely irrelevant to the
8

See Dpnn, op. cit. supra note 4, at 23-26. See also Marcus, NACCA Bar Association,

U.S.

BuREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T oF LABoR, BULL. No. 213, at 196-98, in IAIABC
PROCEEDINGS (1959).
9 See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 211 (1951), particularly: "Money, time

and professional skill were squandered for more than half a century in a scandalously
wasteful manner in settling these claims. Tlie fundamental reason was that, instead of a
claim for compensation being determined on the grounds of public interest, it was
opposed and obstructed at every stage by the adverse interest of the employer or his
insurance company. The resources of numerous legal and medical practitioners were
devoted to resisting the payment of compensation to an injured workman or the
dependents of one who had been killed, regardless of the human and social issues
involved..•.
"These were the considerations which led me to conclude in 1942, that 'the system
of workmen's compensation as it now exists is indefensible, and such it will remain
until the adverse interest of the employer or his insurance company or mutual trade
association is removed, and the determination of the claim carried out by an administrative tribunal or commission having regard only to the public interest in the injured
man or his dependents.'" Id. at 211-12.
.
10 See Donn, op. cit. supra note 4, at 225-26, 232-33; Ross, The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings Before Workmen's Compensation Commission, 36 HARV. L. REv. 263 (1923). See also 2 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 287-88, 296-97.
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proper scope of compensation coverage.11 Also, doctrines regarding
"scope of employment," similarly developed in vicarious liability
cases, were read into the statutory language "arising out of and
in the course of" employment. Among these were the "going and
coming rule" 12 and the rules as t!) deviations from the strict work
pattern. 13 In applying the concept of accidental injury to the
problem of injuries produced by stress and strain, the courts
tended to exclude cases where the stress was "normal to the job," 14
thus producing, in the workmen's compensation context, something very like the old doctrine of assumption of risk. And part
of the old defense of contributory negligence was, in substance,
reinstated by calling it "willful and intentional misconduct,"
including therein deviations from safety rules. 15
Another result of unilateral advocacy was the one-sided role
of medical testimony. Since in most states the employer selected
the doctor (especially during the early history of workmen's compensation), and since his testimony was crucial in most compensation disputes, it is not surprising that doctors likely to be sympathetic to the employer's point of view on such questions tended to
be chosen. Nor is it surprising that doctors were sometimes selected
more for their agility on the witness stand than for their skill in
healing injuries. And even doctors selected purely for professional
competency may have had a tendency, not at all unnatural, to see
things from the point of view of the side which was paying their
fees and from which they hoped future fees would be forthcoming.
When all these factors were added to what seems to be the inherent
conservatism of the medical profession, it is no wonder that the
doctor as a witness tended to become, not an impartial expert,
but a medical advocate for the defense. 16
See I LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 623-25, 630-31.
at 195-96.
13 See, e.g., Wither's Case, 252 Mass. 415, 147 N.E. 831 (1925).
14 See, e.g., DeLille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834 (1933).
15 See I LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 474-80.
16 See BREND, TRAUMATIC MENTAL DISORDERS IN COURTS OF LAW 63 (1938); ROBSON,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 210-12; 2 'WILSON & LEvY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 185, 193,
280-83, 289 (1941), especially: "The doctor qn the other side is generally the representative
of an insurance company and is fully alive to the fact that his interest and those of the
company are identical." BREND, op. cit. supra, at 63-64. See also Doon, op. cit. supra
note 4, stating: "It was found that there was an extremely high correlation between the
opinions of the insurers' physicians and the conclusion best adapted to limiting the
compensation claim••••" Id. at 460-61. "The specialists to whom an insurance company
sends its claimants may be able in their field and capable of rendering a high type of
professional service, but if too great a proportion of their findings are favorable to the
11

12 Id.
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The role of unilateral advocacy was not limited to claim proceedings. It also tended to mold the attitudes of the system's administrators. Some of these were chosen from the personnel of industry
or of the insurance carriers. Others retired from administrative
posts to positions with industry. or insurance companies, thus
stimulating an "identity of interest." The administration of workmen's compensation tended to remain weak for a variety of reasons:
political appointments and control, frequent changes of personnel,
underpaid and overworked staffs, inadequate budgets. And weak
administration was all the more vulnerable to the pressures and
influence implicit in unilateral advocacy.17
In the legislative field, the one-sidedness of the pressures
exerted was perhaps even more marked. An instance has been cited
in which a proposed amendment to a compensation law was summarily tabled in an unnamed southern state because it did not
have the approval of the manufacturers' association. 18 This is
representative of the general, but not invariable, rule that amendments to workmen's compensation laws have not received legislative approval unless they had the sanction of the spokesmen for
employers and insurance carriers. In some jurisdictions this sanction was obtained as a result of bargaining between organized
labor and management. Unfortunately the plight of the injured
worker has often had, for organized labor, a low rating at the
bargaining table, although sometimes useful as a counter in obtaining concessions from management in regard to other types of
fringe benefits. In contrast, the presentation of the employers'
and carriers' point of view has been vigorous, well-organized and
effective. It has repeatedly been backed by the threat that industry
would flee the state in search of a cheaper environment if a single
claimants these specialists will no longer receive the patronage of the insurance compa•
nies. . . . The reports . . • afford convincing proof that insurance company practice
in the chief industrial centers of each jurisdiction studied is, on the whole, restricted
to a relatively small group of doctors whose written reports and findings and verbal
testimony favor their employers, the insurance companies, with monotonous regularity.
The conclusion is inescapable that most of these doctors are selected or retained for their
legal ability in defeating employees' claims rather than for their medical skill in healing
their injuries." Id. at 491.
17 SO?.11,RS 143-48; Reid, President's Address, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T
OF LABOR, BULL. No. 192, at 4, in IAIABC PROCEEDINGS (1956), stating in pertinent part:
"It is of course more often true than not that State boards and commissions and staff
are not insulated from great pressures, political, economic, and other, brought to bear
upon them in the carrying out of their duties." Id. at 12. See also DODD, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 798-803.
18 SOMERS 145.
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additional straw was added to its burden. During the first two
decades of workmen's compensation, this effort was seldom balanced by any comparably effective effort on the other side. Accordingly, amendment to legislation in the compensation field was
largely the creation of the employers. 19

III.

ROLE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR

Why was the defendants' bar substantially unchallenged in its
complete possession of the field for so long? There were many
reasons. Compensation work was so novel and specialized in its
methods and (despite early hopes to the contrary) so complex and
technical that the skill and experience of the lawyer in general
practice were not readily transferable to this field. 20 Yet the practice was not, from the claimants' side, sufficiently lucrative to
attract its own corps of specialists as readily as other highly technical fields, such as tax law, have been able to do. Furthermore,
representing the rich and powerful has always tended to give
lawyers greater professional prestige, as well as greater emoluments.
Yet there was a crying need to be met, and in time this was
accomplished. In the depression years of the 1930's a plaintiffs' bar
sprang into existence. In part this occurred because the rising tide
of claims had reached a point at which a claimant's lawyer, notwithstanding the smallness of individual fees, could make a living
through sheer volume of business-though of course a better living
was still to be had by working the other side of the street. In part
it occurred also because some lawyers, influenced by the social
idealism of the time, were attracted by the idea of becoming defenders of the underdog, devoting their professional careers to the
19 In the early 1940's, the writer was on the legal staff of one of the largest unions
in the country. Until then there was little, if any, organized activity or interest by labor
unions in behalf of the injured employee. A reading of the reports of the workmen's
compensation study commissions of the various states, which reports led to the enactment
of compensation laws, indicate little participation by labor in such formulation, and
even opposition to the enactment of such laws. The writer stimulated the organization
of workmen's compensation departments and committees for international unions and
local unions, all of which led to the establishment, about six years ago, of a workmen's
compensation department at the AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington, D.C.
The statements in this article are based not only upon the writer's expei;ience, but
upon information received from many other attorneys representing labor unions throughout the country, many of whom have drafted proposed legislation, appeared before
legislative committees and have participated in negotiations with management.
20 DAWSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF VvORKMEN's COMPENSATION CLAIMS ADIIUNISTRATJON
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 3 (IAIABC 1951), stating that "workmen's compensation is now considered the most difficult specialty in the entire field of labor legislation."
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amelioration of social and economic injustice. Moreover, some
lawyers had been introduced to this work through their service for
unions or legal aid societies and had become fascinated with it, or
had been type-cast to continue the work for which their previous
experience peculiarly fitted them.
Whatever the reasons, a plaintiffs' bar did spring up and, once
in existence, grew rapidly in numbers and influence. Later, in
the 1940's, Samuel Horovitz's book on workmen's compensation,21
scholarly and well-documented, was in effect the "cry to battle"
for the furtherance of the rights of the injured worker. In 1946,
at the Portland, Oregon, convention of the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions, a handful of
members of the new plaintiffs' bar founded their own association,
the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys,
which came to be known simply as "NACCA." Two years later the
NA C CA Law ] ournal began publication. This became both the
voice of the plaintiffs' bar and its internal system of communication.
Through it the representatives of injured workers, not only in the
workmen's compensation field, but also in the fields of railroad and
admiralty law-and later in tort law generally as well-were able
to exchange ideas and to keep up with the latest decisions and
other developments of importance to their professional work.22
From the beginning, this plaintiffs' bar group has been a partisan one, dedicated to advocating the rights of the injured, especially injured workers. In the compensation field, it has sought to
establish broader and more reasonable definitions of personal
injury or accidental injury, to extend the scope of the employment
covered, to eliminate extraneous fault elements (such as assault,
horseplay and "willful misconduct") from the system, and to controvert the employers' assumed right to determine medical bases
of causation and disability through company doctors or experts
for hire.23
21 HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1944).
22 For a discussion of the history and aims of

NACCA, see SoMERS 180-82; Lambert,
NACCA-Rumor and Reflection, 18 NACCA L.J. 24 (1956). See also Green, The Thrust
of Tort Law: Part 1, The Influence of Environment, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1961), stating
that: "The National Association of Claimants' Counsel of America has tremendously
broadened the understanding of the profession, including the judges, of the significance
of tort litigation and has advanced the proficiency of advocacy immeasurably. Its efforts
have been widely supported and advanced by numerous institutes sponsored by bar
associations and law schools." Id. at 19 n.67.
23 See, e.g., Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws,
41 ILL. L. REv. 311 (1946); Horovitz, Rehabilitation of Injured Workers-Its Legal and
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A. The Causation Dispute
The plaintiffs' bar has been accused of trying to convert workmen's compensation into a general scheme for compensating employee disabilities without regard to whether they are workconnected. Doubtless, claims which are unjustified in this sense
are sometimes filed, but it is believed that the plaintiffs' bar generally has been attemptinq" to correc~ the distortions inherited from
twenty years of unilateral advocacy and to restore a sensible and
humane social security approach. Such an approach is both more
appropriate to the function of workmen's compensation and more
in line with the intention of the movement which gave rise to the
original statutes.
So long as the requirement of legal and medical causation is
retained-as it still is-there is no danger that the distinction
between occupational and non-occupational disability will suffer
a general breakdown. Of course, there will be cases where the
question of whether a disability is work-connected cannot be answered with scientific certainty. We must be content to answer
those on the basis of reasonable probability in the light of current
medical knowledge. 24

B. Equalizing the Contest
Experience seems to indicate plainly that the role of claimants'
attorneys in workmen's compensation is neither a luxury nor a
parasitic growth, but a necessity. Of course, there are justifiable
criticisms which may be made of the plaintiffs' bar. For example,
claimants' attorneys have, it is urged, given entirely too much encouragement to the practice of lump-sum settlements. Lump-sum
settlements are convenient and attractive to claimants' attorneys, as
they are to the insurance carriers, but are seldom consistent with
the goals and purposes of the workmen's compensation system.25
The indispensability of the plaintiffs' bar is perhaps most obvious where an ignorant, confused, preoccupied, and possibly
frightened layman would otherwise be pitted against an experiAdministrative Problems, 31 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 485 (1959); Marcus, Compensability of
Heart Disease-Legal Aspects, 1962 INS. L.J. 341; Page, Comments on Recent Important
Workmen's Compensation Cases, 28 NACCA L.J. 313 (1961-1962).
24 For a leading decision dealing with causation in workmen's compensation, see
Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962).
25 See CHErr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 274-79; MORGAN, SNIDER & SOBOL, LUMP-SUM
R.EDEMl'TION SETTLEMENTS A.ND REHABILITATION (1959).
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enced and skillful professional advo_cate for the employer or the
carrier in a most unfair and unequal contest. Yet it seems that
the normal desire of industry and insurance companies to minimize
costs and maximize profits is not the only element responsible for
the problem. The New York Moreland Commission reported in
1944:
"There is ample evidence that many . . . appeals have been
taken by carriers and employers not in good faith, but evidently for purposes of delay and bargaining. . . . About 70
per cent of all appeals taken by carriers or employers were
withdrawn.... The record of the State Insurance Fund is of
special interest. In the three-year period in question, it withdrew 340 out of 366 appeals taken.... It thus appears that the
Fund alone has taken hundreds of appeals with no serious
intent of carrying them through." 26
So it seems that not only private, but also public, bodies administering compensation funds can be litigious, indeed, abusively
litigious.
Furthermore, not only is it clear that the adversary element is
inherent in the system as it is presently financed, but we should
be wary of the assumption that it can, or should, be wholly
eliminated.
This is not to say that there is not too much litigation, since
plainly there is. As Professor Davis has pointed out, it results from
excessive carrier resistance to claims and is a wasteful drain on the
resources of the present system.27 Indeed, unless some private insurance carriers can adjust themselves to the idea that these are not
tort claims, but insured losses which they have been paid to carry,
and adjust their practices accordingly, the role of the private carrier will continue to be diminished in value, or may even be eliminated, as it has been in England.28

C. Advantages of an Adversary System
However, though far fewer claims should be resisted, it does
not follow that a wholly non-adversary system should be the goal.
Workmen's compensation will always involve the determination
26 RIESENFELD &: MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 342.
27 Davis, Standing To Challenge and Enforce Administrative Action,
REv. 759, 788-89 (1949). See also ROBSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 210-12.
28 SOMERS 299-308.

49

CoLUM.
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of questions of fact which are both disputed and fairly disputable.
We have never evolved any method for their settlement which is as
fair and reliable as having the two sides prepared and presented by
opposing advocates for judgment by an impartial tribunal. 29
The most ambitious attempt to eliminate the adversary element
seems to be that made by the English in 1946, when they eliminated judicial review and barred lai;vyers from all steps in the
proceeding except the final appeal to the commissioner. 30 The
result was not the creation of a non-litigious administrative utopia.
One effect was a series of decisions by the commissioner which were
far more restrictive and illiberal than previous English or contemporary American court decisions on the same questions-and
also far more technical, legalistic and hair-splitting. 31 Even administrators seemingly needed the assistance of a claimant's advocate. In 1958, the English readmitted the lai;vyers to compensation
proceedings, after twelve years of experience with an almost lawyerless system. 32
Certainly the claimant, even if not confronted with an adverse
litigant, would be facing powerful adversaries in the form of the
complexity of the statute, his ignorance of his rights and of how to
assert them, and the bureaucratic rigidity which sets in when administrative power is not tempered by adversary proceedings. He
needs to have someone on his side with expertise, devoted to his
interests, and able to give his problems personal attention. A
theory that the board, commission, or referee will double as his
advocate does not answer the problem. Its quasi-judicial function
precludes it from effectively playing that role. And, even if it
could be trusted to argue the claimant's case, it still could not do
other things which must be done, such as going out and digging
up the evidence necessary to prove the claim.
Furthermore, what happens in the administrative claim proceeding is not the whole story of the role of the plaintiffs' bar.
Larson, for example, points to "a marked increase in the generosity
with which courts have interpreted the statutes," and adds that "it
20 "[A] system of controversy, by having both sides presented by persons competent
to present them and threshed out in a way that, on the whole, experience has shown
is the surest way of arriving at facts." Pound, The Challenge of Occupational Disability,
in PROCl:'.EDINGS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssoCIATION COUNCIL ON INDUSTRIAL HEALTH
(1955).
30 POITER & STANSFELD, NATIONAL INSURANCE (2d ed. 1949).
31 Larson, The l\fyth of Administrative Generosity: A Lesson from British Experience, 40 A.B.A.J. 195 (1954).
32 CHEIT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 273.
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would be an interesting speculation to inquire whether the courts
or the legislatures have done more to bring workmen's compensation from its comparatively narrow beginnings to the place where
we find it today." 33 Wherever a court has broadened and strengthened a statute, it means that a claimant's lawyer has successfully
resisted a narrower construction. Usually it also means that the
claimant's lawyer has first worked out, documented, and persuaded
the court to adopt the line of thought which eventually became
a judicial liberalization. The development of a plaintiffs' bar has
also created a body of experts who can speak for the claimant's
point of view in proposing legislative changes, defending them
before legislative committees, and opposing legislative changes
which might harm the workers' interests.
D. Attorneys' Fees
If the claimant's advocate plays a necessary role in workmen's
compensation, it follows that the system should allow for his
reasonable compensation. The anti-litigation and even anti-lawyer
bias which marked the earlier stages in the development of the
system resulted in controlling the claimant's attorney's fee at an
unreasonably low figure in many jurisdictions.34 Yet no attempt
was ever made to limit the fees which might be paid to the carrier's attorney, notwithstanding the fact that these came out of
premiums and were therefore necessarily capable of having a longrun depressant effect on the benefit level. The control and limitation of fees in connection with workmen's compensation is appropriate and necessary, but this misguided and one-sided application
of the principle has not so much protected the claimant against the
greed of attorneys as put him at a disadvantage by making it difficult for him to get equally competent representation. Furthermore,
where the defense attorney is assured of additional pay for additional work, but his opponent is not, the defense attorney can
take advantage of the situation by bringing unfair pressure for a
compromise settlement-for example, by repeated petitions to
reopen an award.
33 Larson's chapter in Occupational Disability and Public Policy, about to be published by the University of California. See also Larson, Foreword, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 539-40
(1958).
34 For a compilation of statutes and regulations governing attorneys' fees in all
jurisdictions, see BROOKS, ATTORNEY'S FEES IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; A REPORT OF THE
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES IN STATE LEGISLATION, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'r
OF LAnoR, BULL. No. 220 (1960).
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Whatever its amount, the claimant's attorney's fee should be
added to the award, not subtracted from it.85 The statutory benefit is already scaled down to the minimum on which the injured
worker can be expected to get by (in practice, it is often less) and
should not be subject to any deductions. The cost of presenting the
claimant's case should be insured as part of the system, just as the
corresponding cost to the defendant already is. But until this is
done, at least there should be a provision, as there already is in
some states, permitting claimants' attorneys' fees to be imposed
on the carrier where a defense, review, or appeal is undertaken
without reasonable ground. 36

IV.

AN ADDITIONAL TORT REMEDY PROPOSED

Since the theory of eliminating lawyers from the compensation
system has not worked out, and since the present system, after fifty
years, concededly remains inadequate, should we not now restore
the right of a negligently injured worker to bring a damage action,
without requiring the surrender of his right to compensation
payments? I would not propose that the employer should be compelled to pay a second time for any loss against which he has been
compelled to insure, but merely that an injured worker who can
prove that his injury was caused by his employer's negligence
should have the right to a judgment restoring the full amount of
his loss (which compensation does not cover and does not purport
to cover), less whatever he may be entitled to under the compensation system. This would be a less stringent standard than that
which already prevails in England, where the injured worker
retains his right to a negligence action as a cumulative remedyand only half of the amount to which he is entitled under compensation is deducted. 37 Such an added remedy would be humane,
equitable, and logical for a numqer of reasons.
First, if the employer negligently damages another's property,
he is required to restore the full amount of loss; why should his
responsibility be less for negligent injury to a human being? The
rise in jury awards in personal injury cases in recent years reflects
(in addition to rising living standards) an increased awareness that
the injured plaintiff must be valued as a human being. Compensa85 CHEIT, op. dt. supra note 2, at 268; Larson, "Model-T" Compensation Acts in the
Atomic Age, 18 NACCA L.J. 39, 47 (1956).
86 See BROOKS, op. cit. supra note 34.
87 SOMERS 307,
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tion values him as an instrument of production-and it is proper
that it should, since compensation is a wage-loss insurance system.
But, for that very reason, it is improper that a system which cannot take into account his value as a human being should be his
exclusive remedy.
Second, if the employer negligently injures a third person,
he is required to restore the full loss. And the employee can claim
damages on the same principle, notwithstanding his entitlement
to compensation, if the negligence of a third party is the source
of his injury.38 When full restoration for negligently caused injuries is the general rule-and exceptions such as charitable and
governmental immunities are currently being eliminated39-why
should a negligently injured person be discriminated against
merely because the wrongdoer happened to be his own employer?
Third, the added tort remedy would involve principally those
cases, such as death and serious permanent disability, in which
workmen's compensation has proved most chronically, stubbornly,
and cruelly inadequate.40
Fourth, the added tort remedy would make it possible to compensate, in many cases, damage elements which compensation often
does not reach (and is not intended to reach), such as pain and
suffering, and injuries producing permanent disfigurement, impotence, or sterility, which may be of tragic severity yet still fail to
fit into the compensation picture because they result in little or
no wage loss. 41 Doubtless it would be extending compensation
beyond its intended function to impose liability without fault
for such losses. But when they are the result of negligence, and
would be fully compensable in tort if the victim were a nonemployee, why should they go uncompensated merely because a
loss of a different kind has been insured against? 42
38 See generally McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study
of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 389 (1959).
39 See, e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961) (governmental immunity); Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d
930 (Ky. 1961) (charitable immunity).
40 See generally CHElT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 61-185. See also Larson, The Future
of Workmen's Compensation, U.S. BUREAU -OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL•
No. 180, at 5, in IAIABC PROCEEDINGS (1954); Katz &: Wirpel, Workmen's Compensation
1910-1952: Are Present Benefits Adequate?, 1953 INs. L.J. 164.
41 See 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 160-62.
42 In using the phrase "fully compensable," the author suggests its fulfillment by the
abolition of the common-law defenses of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant
doctrine and assumption of risk. This was substantially accomplished in England when
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Fifth, the fact that avoidable injuries would cost the employer
more than unavoidable ones would create an effective economic
motive for safety and prevention-much more so than the relatively slight pressures brought about by differential premiums
resulting from experience ratings. 43
It will be objected that industry cannot afford it. Of course,
there has always been that complaint. It was made when employers'
liability acts were first proposed. It was repeated when workmen's
compensation was first proposed and has been heard since on every
occasion when an effort has been made to improve the system.
Added remedies have been available in England, and apparently in
other countries as well, and seem not to have brought industry to
a halt. Something similar has long been available in admiralty
law in this country. Under the automobile compensation system
in Saskatchewan, the right to a tort remedy is retained, and the
compensation award is deducted from the damage judgment. The
total costs for both compensation and liability coverage is far less
than the average motor vehicle insurance coverage costs the American motorists. 44

A. Effect on Compensation Benefit Levels
Pollack argues that "to obtain workmen's compensation (or
social insurance) and tort liability as concurrent remedies would
probably be at the expense of the workmen's compensation component, which would tend to remain at a low level as a 'floor of
protection.' " 45 However, he does not tell us why this would be
probable. And what little evidence we have seems not to bear this
out. No documented decision is herein made as to the adequacy of
English compensation levels, but it is at least clear that they have
been raised repeatedly in recent years, and thus the availability
of a tort remedy does not seem to have stabilized them as a "floor
workmen's compensation was incorporated (but not absorbed) into the social security
system (Beveridge Plan). See SOMERS 307.
The term "fully compensable" is already applicable to injured railroad and maritime
employees in this country by virtue of the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), the
Jones Act, the Boiler Inspection Act, as well as the non-statutory doctrines of admiralty
law, i.e., seaworthiness.
106·09.
Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation,
IO NACCA L.J. 44 (1952).
45 Pollack, A Policy Decision for Workmen's Compensation, 7 IND. &: LAB. REL. REv.
51, 61 (1953).
43 Sm,IERS
44
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of protection." 46 In this country, we have seen the dollar amounts
of maintenance and cure allotments expand in recent years, notwithstanding the fact that seamen have two additional remedies,
one in negligence and one in strict liability for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness.47
Pollack also suggests that it is "more likely" that the employee
would have to waive his compensation rights in order to sue.48
This undoubtedly would be most undesirable. But why should
any such requirement be accepted? The availability of immediate
compensation payments would cure the tort action of one of its
principal defects-slowness of recovery, with its resulting hardship
and pressure for a compromise settlement-which caused its original abandonment. And if one is regarded as a form of social insurance and the other as an action to right a wrong, then why should
either have to be waived in order to pursue the other?
B. Renegotiating the Bargain

This brings us back to the question of the "quid pro quo," the
original agreement in which the workers' tort rights were supposedly bargained away in order to obtain a workmen's compensation system. This, it seems to me, was merely part of the hesitant
and apologetic manner in which the compensation principle originally had to be introduced, in order to soften opposition and to
mollify courts which, it was feared, might hold (as indeed the New
York Court of Appeals once did) 49 that the imposition of liability
without fault deprived the employer of property without due process of law. Exclusiveness of remedy was thus-like elective coverage or confining the act to "hazardous" industries-one of the
compromises by which the initial blow was softened. Today it is
generally recognized that coverage should be compulsory and that
all industries should be included. 50
Does exclusiveness of remedy have a better case? Probably
not. If workmen's compensation were a substitute tort remedy,
46 SOMERS 299-311; MUNKMAN, EMPLOYERS LIABILITY AT COMMON LAw (1950), reviewed
in 11 NACCA L.J. 314 (1953).
47 Stumberg, The Jones Act, Remedies of Seamen, 17 Omo ST. L.J. 484-86 (1956).
The rising costs of living and medical care govern the rising costs of maintenance and
cure.
48 See Pollack, supra note 45.
40 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
50 Parsekian, Report, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, Buu.. No.
213, at 96-98, in IAIABC PROCEEDINGS (1959); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF
LABoR, BuLL. No. 212, op. cit. supra note 2.
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then there would be reason to say that the worker cannot have
both: he cannot have his new right and yet keep the old one for
which it was substituted. But most authorities now agree i:hat
viewing compensation as a substitute tort remedy is unsound.
Compensation, instead, is regarded as a type of insurance, the cost ·
of which ought to be borne by the enterprise. Thus, it follows
that installing the system did not deprive the employer of anything
for which he has to be paid, nor bestow anything on the worker
that he ought to be required to buy by surrendering rights to
which he would otherwise be entitled.
We are already chipping away at the exclusiveness of compensation and experimenting with tort remedy restorations. Many jurisdictions allow third-party actions against co-employees, 51 and New
Hampshire has gone so far as to permit a tort action against the
employer's compensation insurance carrier for failing to discover
defects in a compressed air tank, after the carrier had undertaken
to conduct monthly inspections of the plant. 52 Employers have
been held liable to their employees at common law for intentional
torts such as assault and battery, 53 false imprisonment, 54 slander, 55
and conspiracy in submitting a false medical report. 56
This chipping away cannot be attributed to greed on the part
of plaintiffs and their attorneys, but to the fact that injured workmen and their dependents have serious needs which are not being
met by the workmen's compensation system. It would be better
for the future of that system, as well as for the victims of industrial
injuries, if the need and propriety of restoring tort actions as a
conjunctive, and cumulative, remedy were frankly recognized.
Compensation-covered employees cannot be expected to put
up indefinitely with recoveries of one-fifth to one-tenth of the
amounts which courts would award, and are awarding, for the same
injuries in negligence cases. Unless the exclusive-remedy principle
is abandoned, the inequities which have already caused railroad
workers and seamen to resist extension of compensation to their
industries may force others to press for its abolition. This would be
51 See, e.g., Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962) (FECA); Ransom v. Haner,
362 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1961); Hockett v. Chapman, 69 N.M. 324, 366 P.2d 850 (1961).
52 Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960).
!i3 Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930).
!i4 Powers v. Middlesboro Hosp., 258 Ky. 20, 79 S.W.2d 391 (1935).
!iii Braman v. Walthall, 215 Ark. 582, 225 S.W.2d 342 (1949).
ts6 Flamm v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 18 Misc. 2d 154, 185 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
afj'd, IO App. Div. 2d 885, 202 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1960).
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tragic, as compensation will always be needed to cover wage losses
which are part of the unavoidable risks of modern technology and
are thus not compensable by any fault-oriented remedy. It would
also be unnecessary, since experience in England and elsewhere
shows that exclusiveness of remedy is not an intrinsic requirement
of a sound compensation system, but merely one of the lasting
birthmarks the system bears in this country as a result of the struggles and compromises by which it was brought into being.
But whether or not workmen's compensation solves its problems by the method here proposed, the claimants' advocate has
been and is likely to remain a constant stimulus for the improvement of the system to the end that it will adequately and justly
serve the injured worker.
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